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Oregon v. Elstad: THE CAT IS NOT 
OUT OF THE BAG 
In an opinion harshly criticized by dis-
senting Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Stevens, Justice O'Connor and the Su-
preme Court have delivered a new ap-
proach to the fifth amendment's self-in-
crimination clause. Though fairly narrow, 
the holding that a subsequent confession 
gained after Miranda warnings is valid 
even where a previous uncoerced confes-
sion was obtained from a suspect absent 
Miranda rights discards well-founded doc-
trines which for years have buttressed the 
Miranda rationale. As the dissenters in-
timate, it is more the reasoning than the ac-
tual holding of the Court which fosters a 
nervous reaction. 
Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985), 
involved an 18-year-old accused of bur-
glarizing his neighbor's home. After being 
contacted by a witness to the burglary, 
the sheriff's office dispatched two offi-
cers to the home of Michael Elstad with a 
warrant for his arrest. Upon arriving at 
the home, both officers were escorted to 
Elstad's bedroom by his mother. After 
dressing, Elstad accompanied them into 
the living room, sat down with one of the 
officers, and following a brief discussion 
of the burglary, confessed to the crime. 
His Miranda rights had not been given. 
Approximately one hour after reaching 
the sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was 
given his Miranda rights, which he subse-
quently waived. He then gave a full state-
ment confessing to the burglary. 
The trial court found Elstad guilty of 
burglary. On appeal, that decision was 
reversed on the grounds that the de-
fendant's inadmissible earlier confession 
''tainted'' the later confession which oc-
curred after the defendant was advised of 
his Miranda rights. Oregon v. Elstad, 61 
Ore. App. 673, 658 P.2d 552 (1983). In 
the words of the court, "the cat was suffi-
ciently out of the bag to exert a coercive 
impact on [the respondent's] later admis-
sion." !d. at 678, 658 P.2d at 555. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to consider 
whether the self-incrimination clause of 
the fifth amendment requires the suppres-
sion of a confession, made after proper 
Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of 
rights solely because the police had ob-
tained an earlier voluntary admission with-
out warnings from the defendant. 
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor sug-
gests that, "a simple failure to administer 
the warnings, unaccompanied by any ac-
tual coercion or other circumstances cal-
culated to undermine the suspect's ability 
to exercise his free will" is not enough to 
taint a subsequent voluntary and informed 
waiver. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. at 1293. The 
counter argument to this coercion-based 
analysis was espoused in U.S. v. Bayer, 
331 U.S. 532 (1947). 
After the accused has once let the cat 
out of the bag by confessing, no mat-
ter what the inducement, he is never 
thereafter free of the psychological 
and practical disadvantages of having 
confessed. He can never get the cat 
back in the bag, the secret is out for 
good. In such a sense, a later confes-
sion may always be looked upon as 
fruit of the first. 
!d. at 540-41. 
Until Elstad, the state had the burden of 
showing that the lack of a warning did not 
taint subsequently obtained evidence. See 
Alderman v. United States, 594 U.S. 165 
(1969). Elstad changes this and seems to 
have placed the burden on the defendant. 
Justice Brennan explains, "the Court to-
day appears to adopt a- 'go ahead and try 
to prove it' posture toward citizens whose 
fifth amendment Miranda rights have been 
violated, an attitude that marks a sharp 
break from the Court's traditional approach 
to official lawlessness." Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 
at 1312. 
- Tom Swisher 
Archer v. Archer: PROFESSIONAL 
DEGREE IS NOT MARITAL 
PROPERTY 
In Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 
A.2d 1074 (1985), the Maryland Court of 
Appeals joined a majority of jurisdictions 
and held that professional degrees and 
licenses earned by a spouse during the 
marriage are not marital property and, 
therefore, are not subject to a monetary 
award. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. 
§ 8-205 (1984). 
The court recognizes a broad definition 
of "property," embracing everything which 
has exchangeable value or goes to make 
up a persons worth. Nevertheless, the 
court held a professional degree to be a 
mere "expectancy of future enhanced in-
come," "an intellectual attainment," and 
not a present property interest. 
The parties to the litigation, Jeanne and 
Thomas Archer, were married in 1977 
after Thomas Archer's first year of medi-
cal school. At that time, Jeanne Archer 
was pursuing an undergraduate degree 
but left school and began to work full-
time. During their marriage, Jeanne 
Archer worked and had two children and 
Thomas Archer attended medical school. 
Thomas Archer received medical school 
expenses, a monthly stipend and other 
monies from the United States Navy. Cit-
ing recent Maryland court decisions, the 
court stated that the Family Law Article 
requires that non-monetary contributions 
should be recognized in determining the 
acquisition of marital property. Careful 
consideration should be given to both 
monetary and non-monetary contribution 
by the spouses so that property interests 
can be fairly and equitably adjusted. 
The appellant, Jeanne Archer, argued 
that marital property defined in the Fam-
ily Law Article as "the property, however 
titled, acquired by one or both of the 
parties during marriage" should be liber-
ally construed and include medical degrees 
or licenses in order to effect the broad 
remedial purposes of the Act. However, 
the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected 
this view. 
The court seemed to adopt the reason-
ing of In re Marriage of Graham, 194 
Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), which 
held that an advanced degree or profes-
sional license lacks the traditional attri-
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